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Shari‘a and Fiqh: Embodiments of the Theoretical and the Practical
Margaret Pettygrove
The relationship between law and morality is such that it
is not easy to separate the two concepts. Generally in Islam, law
and morality are one and the same, and speaking of them as
distinct ideas is not really possible. It is largely a problem of
language, in that English distinguishes between law and morality,
whereas Arabic does not clearly do so. It is, nevertheless, possible
to parse the Shari‘a into aspects that resemble morality and those
that resemble law, as Bernard Weiss does in The Search for God’s
Law. The Shari‘a is the “totality of ‘divine categorizations of
human acts’” (Weiss 1). However, the Shari‘a does not provide
clear enough rules to guide behavior, and so must be articulated
by Muslim scholars into concrete laws. The result is that Shari‘a
comes to represent a theoretical law that cannot alone provide
the legal code for a community. Despite the difficulty of
separating law and morality within Islam, it is possible to view the
Shari‘a as constituting morality and not law.
In Islam law and morality are not divorceable. However,
by adopting nuanced conceptions of law and morality as two parts
that comprise one entity, it is possible to look at ways in which law
and morality differ. In that morality represents punishment on
judgment day and law represents punishment on earth by human
judges, we can distinguish law and morality as two different
aspects of Shari‘a categorizations (4). This is how Weiss
distinguishes between law and morality in the categorizations of
the Shari‘a. According to Weiss, particular categorizations of the
Shari‘a—such as the categorizations of obligatory and
forbidden—constitute rules of law because they give no option
but to comply (3). Yet, he says, they also fall within the scope of
morality. From this, Weiss concludes that, although law and
morality in Islam are one and the same, they can be viewed as
different aspects of the same concept (3-4). The key distinction
between law and morality is “relevance to judicial proceeding”
(4). The Shari‘a categorizations of obligatory and forbidden
constitute both law and morality because they are relevant to
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enforcement on earth and on the Day of Judgment. Thus, that
which is relevant to enforcement by human judges corresponds
to law, while that which is relevant to divine judgment constitutes
morality.
Weiss uses this idea of relevance to judicial proceeding to
illustrate that the categorizations of the Shari‘a are comprised of
both law and morality. It seems, however, given Weiss’
conceptions of law and morality, that the Shari‘a is more
congruous with morality and less so with law. Law and morality
are inseparable in Islam, and so in a sense Shari‘a must still
constitute both. Yet given the distinction that Weiss makes
between law and morality based on relevance to earthly or divine
judgment, the Shari‘a falls more under the scope of morality.
Because the Shari‘a ultimately plays the role of an ideal and
theoretical law, its direct relevance to this-worldly judicial
proceedings is limited. Weiss says that Muslims live “under the
shadow of…two tribunals, one this-worldly and presided over by a
human judge…and the other other-worldly and presided over by
the divine judge” (4). Both aspects constitute law (where law is a
set of enforced rules), but divine judgment more closely
resembles morality.
It would be reasonable to argue that neither realm of
judgment really constitutes morality—in a modern conception of
the term—because morality today is generally taken to mean
guidelines for behavior for which there is not necessarily going to
be a punishment. In all cases in Islam, there will be some form of
retribution, whether by a human or divine judge. Thus behavior
is always dictated by the threat of punishment, and as such might
not constitute behavior based on morality. However, even in the
modern context of morality, given a religious framework, it is
usually seen as deriving from obedience to a god or higher
power. Thus it does still make sense to equate divine judgment
with morality.
Because the Shari‘a only becomes functional when it is
interpreted and formulated by jurists into practical rules for
behavior, it does not constitute “law” in the manner that Weiss
describes. It is the ideal model from which practical judgments
are made but does not serve as law in itself, and so falls into the
category of morality. The categorizations of the Shari‘a are made
concrete in fiqh, and it is only through these articulations that
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applicable laws are created. Weiss uses “law” to mean “positive
law,” as opposed to “moral code” (5). As a moral code is
something that prescribes behavior but will only be enforced in
another world (or not at all), the Shari‘a is more like a moral
code than it is positive law. The Shari‘a does represent authority
from which fiqh is derived, but it is fiqh which provides the actual
understanding of divine law, and so it is fiqh which lays down the
positive law under which Muslims live.
It is in this manner that the Shari‘a falls solidly into the
realm of morality and out of the realm of law. Although the
Shari‘a consists of divine law that will be enforced by God on
Judgment Day, it is only with the articulations presented in fiqh
that actual rules for how to act are established, and thus the
Shari‘a in itself represents only a theoretical law. It is from the
formulations of Muslim jurists that “we find law that may be
applied in courts” (16). The Shari‘a bears very little direct
relevance to this-worldly justice because its categorizations are
not applicable in a practical sense until they are fully articulated
in fiqh. Weiss uses morality to describe rules that pertain to justice
in the afterlife; the Shari‘a is primarily relevant to other-worldly
justice. It is not that the Shari‘a is concerned only with rules that
will be enforced in another world, but that it is an ideal law that
does not function as a guiding system until it is articulated in fiqh.
The Shari‘a consists of categorizations that pertain to this-worldly
matters, but it is in a form that needs to be interpreted and
reformulated into workable laws. As Weiss explains, the Shari‘a is
a “sort of Platonic ideal that scholars try to realize” (16). The
Shari‘a is the inspiration and source of authority for Islamic law
as expressed in fiqh, but because the Shari‘a represents only an
ideal for which to strive, it remains a largely theoretical body of
law. The theoretical relevance of Shari‘a to earthly justice as the
source of practical law is not sufficient to grant it the status of law.
Fiqh is able to stand as law “in its own right,” and thus it makes
sense to call Shari‘a morality rather than law (16). Once law is
articulated in fiqh, a community could potentially dispose of the
Shari‘a and still have rules to govern life. Whatever legal
prescriptions the Shari‘a makes, it is fiqh that actually instructs
Muslims on how to behave. Even if the Shari‘a is called “God’s
law” and fiqh “the jurists’ law,” it is still fiqh that articulates both
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divine and earthly law. The formulations of the jurists are
obligatory to understanding law, including divine law.
Law in Islam is “not a given,” but must be interpreted
and deciphered from a “set of indicators,” which are found in the
Qur’an and Shari‘a (16). This looks distinctly like law derived
from morality. To the extent that morality is a loose framework
off of which one bases actions, the Shari‘a is morality. Morality
gives us ideas about what is right and wrong, but does not provide
strict rules about particulars. Morality gives generals, from which
can be derived rules about particulars. If morality stipulates that
killing is wrong, then it may be the role of law to say if it is always
wrong or if there are specific cases in which it is justified. Morality
can inform legal decisions, but morality alone cannot constitute
positive law. Fiqh, as the articulation of particulars from generals
contained in the Shari ‘a, represents law; the Shari‘a represents
morality.
Early Muslim scholars were primarily concerned with the
understanding of the Shari‘a as it is associated with practice or
action (3). Transitioning from theoretical law to practical law
allowed for the definition of particulars from generals, and both
were necessary in creation of a system of law that could practically
govern a community. The Shari‘a provides prescriptions for
behavior in its five categorizations, but these are somewhat vague
and unspecific. It became necessary to take the divine law given
in the Shari‘a and formulate it into concrete rules for behavior.
Jurists articulated what was in the Shari‘a into practical law, or
fiqh. By inferring practical law from the Shari‘a, jurists moved
from the general to the particular.
Although Weiss distinguishes law and morality only by
relevance to judicial proceedings, there is another important
distinction between the two concepts, which lies in the
formulation of rules by each. Morality provides a fluid outline of
what are right and wrong behaviors, whereas law communicates
more particular rules and prescriptions for behavior. This
differentiation between generals and particulars can also be
viewed in the distinction between theoretical and practical. Broad
general rules provide a theoretical moral framework, while
particulars dictate practical rules that govern very specific actions.
If there are actions that are not ruled by this-worldly
law—that is, they will only be judged by God in the afterlife—
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these may be considered as belonging solely to the realm of
divine law. In this way Shari‘a can still be seen as constituting a
form of law, in that it pertains to rules that will be enforced by
reward or punishment. Yet given Weiss’ use of the term “law” to
indicate relevance to adjudication by human jurists, Shari‘a does
not constitute law because it does not provide the actual rules
that comprise the earthly legal system. As explained above, it is
fiqh that establishes rules pertaining to this-worldly law, not the
Shari‘a.
We can call God’s revelation law because its rules are
eventually enforced, but this divine law more closely resembles
morality because we cannot take it alone to provide practical
rules for community living. There is a necessary intermediate step
between the ideal law and its practical formulation. From divine
law jurists must create a set of laws to guide behavior, and without
this practical articulation it would be difficult to understand how
to behave in accordance with what God desires. The vagueness of
the Qur’an and Shari‘a necessitates articulation of a practical law.
Fiqh is the articulation and understanding of the Shari‘a
(24). Islamic philosopher al-Amidi placed particular emphasis on
the understanding of Shari‘a as attainment of a special kind of
knowledge. Possessing this knowledge elevated one to a higher
status as a learned person (25). One implication of this is that
those who reach this understanding of the Shari‘a obtain power.
Only Muslim jurists are qualified to articulate the rules of fiqh,
and these jurists have extra authority because they have the
understanding. Amidi writes that although interpretation of the
categorizations contained in the Shari‘a is very much a matter of
opinion, fiqh is “knowledge, based on incontestable perception,
of what constitutes [valid] conformity to those categorizations”
(Weiss 25). The Shari‘a can be interpreted in multiple ways, so it
is left to those with authority to establish the correct
interpretation. Understanding of Shari‘a categorizations is
fallible, but acceptance of jurists’ articulations is necessary in
order to have practical laws under which a community can
function (26).
Through the articulation of universals, Islamic jurists
established orthodoxy, which meant essentially the codification of
morality. Scholars understood a morality given by God in the
Qur‘an and Shari‘a which they then transcribed into practical
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rules. The unity of law and morality is maintained in the creation
of Islamic orthodoxy (not only what one must believe, but also
the set of required practices). That is, orthodoxy prescribes law,
but it equally connotes morality because one is compelled to obey
based on a belief in God and commitment to obeying him.
Practical jurisprudence is the manifestation of theoretical
jurisprudence and the ideal law. This creates practical rules for
behavior in an attempt to maintain the spirit and ideals of the
theoretical law. In using the term orthodoxy, I mean orthodoxy
as the created set of accepted practices and beliefs that are
particularly intended to have widespread, practical application.
Fiqh or practical jurisprudence are orthodoxy, whereas the
Qur’an or even Shari‘a are not inherently orthodox. Something
becomes orthodoxy once it is processed and adopted by those in
power and claimed to be the truth or the only right way. Islamic
jurists had to work out practical law given a rather open set of
decrees in the Shari‘a, and this was where orthodoxy could be
established. Orthodoxy is important with regard to jurisprudence
because it creates a standard framework of prescriptions while
maintaining the motivation or derivation from morality and
religious devotion. If rulers simply said ‘you should do x, y and z
because it’s good and we will punish you if you don’t,’ this is
harder to impose broadly. But under jurisprudence, leaders
could create equally rigid laws by appealing to religious devotion
and belief in God. A practical articulation (fiqh) of the Shari‘a as
it applies to everyday life is necessary to create a unified
community with a standard set of behaviors and practices. Then it
becomes necessary to call this law and enforce it on this earth.
Where the creators of law can appeal to a model of religious
morality they will have greater success in unifying a community
and controlling behavior. In interpreting the Shari‘a and creating
the articulation of practical law in fiqh, jurists created orthodoxy
that maintained a moral basis for law.
Fiqh itself is authoritative, in that it constitutes each
individual’s understanding of the Shari‘a, and each must abide by
this particular understanding (14). The Shari‘a is immutable, but
fiqh is flexible enough to remain open to diverse interpretations.
Thus, in articulating practical law from a body of theoretical
universals, Islamic jurists could exercise power and authority over
a community in a manner that did not conflict with the authority
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of God given in the Qur’an and the Shari‘a. Fiqh brought the
Shari‘a into the realm of interpretation and human control.
In the end, we are still confronted by the linguistic
problem created in the attempt to separate law and morality. It
makes sense that law and morality cannot truly be divorced in
Islam, because the two concepts are inherently intertwined. Also,
there is a significant dichotomy between theoretical and practical
jurisprudence that lends difficulty to the categorization of Islamic
texts as law or morality. However, with deliberate and clear
understanding of what is meant by the terms law and morality
they can be distinguished. Although separate words for law and
morality do not exist in Islam, there are evident differences
between theoretical and practical law that closely resemble the
distinction between morality and law. Law and morality may
never exist without each other, but this does not mean we cannot
speak of them as different concepts.
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